Regional Organizations and Response to Political Threat: A Review of the Role of ECOWAS in Ebola and Boko Haram Crises by Brenya, Edward & Kuffuor, Owura Kwabena
Asian Journal of Social Sciences  
and Management Studies 
ISSN: 2313-7401 
Vol. 2, No. 3, 82-88, 2015 
http://www.asianonlinejournals.com/index.php/AJSSMS 
 
 
* Corresponding Author 
 
 
82 
 
Regional Organizations and Response to Political Threat: A 
Review of the Role of ECOWAS in Ebola and Boko Haram 
Crises 
  
Edward Brenya
1*
--- Owura Kwabena Kuffuor
2
 
 
1
Lecturer, History and Political Studies Department, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana 
2
Teaching Assistant, History and Political Studies Department,  Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License 
Asian Online Journal Publishing Group 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................... 83 
References ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economic Community of West Africa like all regional and international bodies takes priority in 
promoting peace and security for their members. However, the responses by ECOWAS have been 
contradictory in many cases where they have been confronted with issues of security in the region. 
This paper examines the response of ECOWAS‟ to the issues of Ebola outbreak and Boko Haram 
Crises. It delves into the origins of both Ebola and Boko Haram and assesses the damage it has 
caused the West African sub region. The paper further critically analyses the response of ECOWAS 
to these two issues in the context of the protocol established to deal with issues of regional security 
threat. The paper finds that even though the regional body‟s response to Ebola was unduly delayed, 
its actions contributed to the curtailing of the spread of the deadly disease. However, ECOWAS‟ 
response to the activities of Boko Haram has not been encouraging as the protocol established by the 
ECOWAS to deal with issues of terrorism relating to regional security threat has not been invoked to 
deal with the security threat posed by the members of Boko Haram. Therefore, the paper concludes 
that the regional body‟s response to Boko Haram has been poor and disappointing and calls on the 
governments of the countries in the ECOWAS region to take proactive steps to curtail the Boko 
Haram issues so as to bring lasting peace in Nigeria and the region. 
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1. Introduction 
Right after the First World War, the desire by states to achieve global peace has been unwavering. It started with 
the formation of the League of Nations, led mostly by President F.D Roosevelt of the United States of America. The 
league was tasked to ensure the non-occurrence of a global scale of violence. The league failed to achieve this 
mandate, which led to the Second World War. Subsequently, the United Nations was formed after the Second World 
War to among others: 
a. Maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of peace (Article 1 of the UN Charter) 
The effort of states in promoting global peace is also championed at the regional or continental level and 
supranational bodies such as the ECOWAS is known for that purpose in Western African region. 
 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed on 28
th
 May 1975 is made up of 16 
member states to among other things; 
1. Promote cooperation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in 
order to raise the living standards of its people and to maintain among and enhance economic stability 
among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent Article 3:1 of 
ECOWAS treaty (ECOWAS Commission, 1975). 
The means of achieving the objectives was through the implementation of the provisions outlined in the 
subsections of the treaty. To that effect, ECOWAS signed a protocol on Non-Aggression on 22
nd
 April, 1978. On 
22
nd
 April 1978, it signed another protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense which basically aimed at giving mutual 
aid assistance for defense against any armed threat or aggression on a member state.  ECOWAS further deepened its 
resolve in promoting the above protocol by signing another protocol that stipulated mechanism for conflict 
prevention, management, resolution, peace keeping and security.  
The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense seeks to among other things implement the relevant provisions of 
the protocol on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in defense, free movement of persons, the right of residence 
establishment, strengthen cooperation in areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peace keeping operations, 
control of cross border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel monies. It 
also seeks to maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the community (ECOWAS Commission, 
1999). The ideals of the protocol are mouthwatering however; its implementation has been quite problematic.  
The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense anticipates three types of aggression namely: 
1. An internal armed conflict in a member state organized and actively supported from without and likely to 
endanger the peace and security of the entire community 
2.  An armed conflict between two or more member states or 
3.  Or an external armed threat or aggression. 
The protocol further outlines how to deal with these types of aggressions, as follows: 
1. An ECOWAS authority to act as the supreme organ to determine when to invoke the protocol and determine 
the necessity for military action. 
2.  A defense council composed of foreign and defence ministers of member states to assist the authority in 
this function. 
3.  A defense commission of chiefs of defence of member states responsible for examining the technical 
aspects of any defence issue and implementing any duties assigned to the defense council. 
4. A deputy executive secretary (military who would be a senior serving military officer to take charge of the 
administration and implementation of defence; and  
(a) Allied Armed Forces of the community consisting of designated units of armed forces of member 
states, under a force commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority on the advice of the Defense 
Council. 
 
1.1. Regional Security Threat 
In modern times, the world faces little danger from direct military assault from opposing states. Rather the 
threats the world faces today ranges from environmental degradation, terrorism and drug trafficking. This has 
generated an argument as to the right definition of security in the 21
st
 century. Lake and Morgan (1997) defines 
security as being free from deliberate man made violence. They explain further that security deals with the 
maintenance, use and management of capacities either to inflict or to defend against man made violence, especially 
war and by extension the conduct of political relationships. According to them, anything that affects these capacities 
or likelihood of their use may have an impact on security affairs and security concerns. On the other hand believes 
that state centric models of security are ineffective in coping with issues such as the spread of diseases that originate 
with sovereign boundaries but have effects that is felt regionally and globally. He agitates for focusing on human 
security which defines security in relation to the individual and not the state.  
The definition offered by Lake and Morgan (1997) suggests that anything that reduces one‟s capability to be free 
from man-made violence is a security threat. However, the definition is quite ambiguous and makes it difficult in 
finding a place for it in modern security analysis. This is because issues such as drug trafficking and disease spread 
does not necessarily inhibit one‟s ability to be free from man-made violence. Yet, drug trafficking and disease spread 
has become a major security challenge in modern times. In light of this Brower‟s definition will be more appropriate 
in the context of this article. 
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1.2. Region  
Lake and Morgan (1997) defines a region as a set of states affected by at least one trans-border but local 
externality that emanates from a particular geographic area. In a case where this externality is a security threat, it 
becomes a regional security threat. Therefore, by these definitions Ebola and activities of the Boko Haram can be 
considered as serious security threat to West African countries. 
 
1.3. Ebola 
Ebola is a virus disease spread through contact with body fluids of symptomatic patients. Before its outbreak in 
West Africa, Ebola broke out in central Africa in limited size and geographic spread. The largest previous outbreaks 
occurred in the districts of Gulu, Masindi and Mbarara in Uganda. The outbreak generated 425 cases over the course 
of three (3) months from October 2000 to January 2001. Additionally there was an outbreak of Ebola in West Africa 
which began in Guinea in December 2013. By September 14th 2014 there was a total of 4507 confirmed and 
probable cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) as well as 2296 deaths from the virus had been reported from five 
countries in West Africa, namely; Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone. According to the WHO Ebola 
Response (2014); the morbidity and mortality rate of EVD is far larger than all previous epidemic combined.  
The map below in Figure 1.0 shows the districts that have been affected by Ebola virus disease in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The gray circles indicate the total numbers of confirmed and probable Ebola cases 
reported in each affected district, and the red circles are the number cases reported during the 21 days leading up to 
September 14, 2014. The Ebola Virus Disease was declared an epidemic with a “public health emergency of 
international concern” by the WHO in 8th August, 2014. Because of the means of transmission, it became a regional 
security issue as it was considered that the disease could be transmitted into any country and causes an epidemic. 
 
 
Figure-1.Districts Affected by Ebola Virus Disease in Three Countries in Africa 
               Source:WHO Ebola Response (2014) 
 
1.4. ECOWAS Response to Ebola 
As a result of the seriousness and rate of fatality of the disease, an emergency ECOWAS ministerial meeting on 
EVD was held in Accra from July 2-3, 2014 involving 11 countries and a number of key international partners. In a 
communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the ministers agreed that the EVD poses a serious threat to all 
countries in the ECOWAS sub-region and called for immediate action (GNA, 2014). They intimated that there has 
been adverse social and economic impact of the Ebola outbreak. They further called for coordinated actions by all 
stakeholders, national leadership, enhanced cross border collaboration and community participation in the response. 
The ministers called on the WHO to lead an international effort to promote research on EVD and other hemorrhagic 
fever (GNA, 2014). 
Following this meeting, the 45
th
 ordinary session of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government was held in 
Accra at which the chairman of the ECOWAS called on Presidents in the West African sub region to as a matter of 
urgency pull resources together to fight the Ebola virus. He challenged medical research institutions in the sub region 
to find a cure or vaccines for the disease. The chairman also took advantage of the opportunity to call on 
international partners to help with the fight against EVD. Prior to this meeting, the WHO had been invited to the 
emergency meeting of health Ministers at which Dr. Luis Gomes Sambo, Regional Director, WHO Regional Office 
for Africa, outlined the recommendations that WHO had made to West Africa member states. The recommendations 
were as follows; 
1. The head of state of an affected country should declare a national emergency; personally address the nation 
to provide information on the situation, outline the steps being taken to address the outbreak and critical 
role of the community in ensuring its rapid control, provide immediate access to emergency financing to 
initiate and sustain response operations and ensure all necessary measures are taken to mobilise and 
remunerate the necessary healthcare workforce, 
2. In areas of intense transmission (e.g. the cross border area of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia) the 
provision of quality clinical care and material and psychological support for the affected populations should 
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be used as the primary basis for reducing the movement of people, but extraordinary supplemental 
measures such as quarantine should be used as considered necessary. 
3. States should conduct exit screening of all persons at international airports, seaports and major land 
crossings, for unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection. The exit screening 
should consist of, at least, a questionnaire, a temperature measurement and, if there is fever, an assessment 
of the risk that the fever is caused by EVD. Any person with an illness consistent with EVD should not be 
allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evaluation. 
4. There should be no general ban on international travel or trade, restrictions outlined in these 
recommendations regarding the travel of EVD cases and contacts. 
Dr. Sambo further indicated that the WHO was working with various important partners through the ECOWAS 
Sub Regional Ebola Outbreak Coordinating Center based in Conakry, Guinea to manage the response of the 
outbreak. He further stated that he had signed an Agreement for USD 60 million Ebola grants, flexible money, to 
boost the immediate response capacity of health services in affected countries.  
The Chairman of ECOWAS additionally embarked on a one day tour of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea to 
show solidarity to these countries because they were the worst hit of the EVD. He took advantage of this tour to 
condemn the isolation and discrimination against Ebola affected countries. The chairman also called on donors to 
fast track promises and pledges for the affected countries. Due to these efforts by ECOWAS, Nigeria, a country that 
contracted the disease on 20th July, 2014 was able to effectively fight the spread of the disease such that it was 
declared Ebola free country on 20
th
 October 2014 (WHO Ebola Response, 2014). 
 
Table 1.0 below outlines the chronology of some of the activities of Boko Haram. 
 
Table-1.A Sequential Table Of Activities Of Boko Haram 
Date Event 
December 2003 First known attack by Boko Haram at multiple police stations in the state of Yobe near the Niger 
bushes 
July 2009 Boko Haram uprisings at Bauchi and spreads to the states of Borno, Kano and Yobe. The militant 
group kills scores of police officers 
September 7, 2010 In the state of Bauchi, 50 Boko Haram militants attack a prison killing the people and releasing 
more than 700 inmates  
May 29, 2011 On the day of president Goodluck Jonathan‟s inauguration. Boko Haram detonates 3 IEDS near a 
military barracks in the city of Bauchon in Bauchi state. At least 10 people die in attacks. 
August 25, 2011 12 people die after Boko Haram militants attack a police station and two banks in the city of 
Gombi Adamawa 
August 26 2011 Boko Haram attacks the UN compounds in Abuja. A car bomb kills 23 people and injures more 
than 75 others 
November 4 2011 More than 100 die in multiple attacks in Yobe, Damaturo and Borno states. Boko Haram militants 
utilize IED‟s and vehicle borne IED‟s to target security forces and other offices, markets and 
churches 
January 20 2012 More than 200 people are killed when Boko Haram launches coordinated attacks targeting police, 
military a prison and other target s in the city of Kano in Kanu state 
April 19 2013 Boko Haram battles with multinational security forces from Niger, Nigeria and Chad in the city 
of Baga in Borno state leaving nearly 200 people dead including many civilians 
June  2013 Boko Haram targets churches in various states on three Sundays in a row leaving more than 50 
people dead 
September 17 2013 Boko Haram gunmen dress in military uniforms and stage a checkpoint near Benisheik in Borno, 
executing travelers and burning vehicles leaving at least 143 people dead. 
January 26, 2014 At least 45 are killed in Kanuri in Borno after Boko Haram militants open fire 
February 11, 2014 At least 23 people are killed when suspected Boko  Haram militants torch houses in the village of 
Konduga according to governor of Borno state 
April 14 2014 Boko Haram militants kidnap approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok 
in Borno 
May 13 2014 Hundreds of Boko Haram militants storm three villages in the state of Borno. Villagers resist, 
killing more than 200 Boko Haram fighters 
May 20 2014 Town blast in the city of Jos kill 118 people at a market. 
June 3-4 2014 Hundreds of people are killed in raids by Boko Haram militants in the state of Borno with some 
sources putting the death toll at 400 to 500 
June 7-8 2014 Suspected Boko Haram militants kidnap at least 20 young women over a weekend in the north 
eastern Nigeria village of Garkin Fulani 8 kilometers from a town where more than 200 school 
girls were taken nearly two months earlier 
June 18-22 2014 Boko haram militants hold the village of Kummabza in Borno state northeastern Nigeria hostage 
for four days. The abduct more than 60 females including children and kill 30 men in the raid 
July 17, 2014 Boko Haram raids the Nigerian town of Daboa. By the time the raid ends, 66 residents have been 
killed and more than 15000 fled  
January 3 2015 A multi day raid begins where hundreds of Boko harm gunmen seize the town of Bage and 
neighboring villages in northern Nigeria as well as multinational military base, leaving bodies 
scattered everywhere and as many as 2000 people feared dead 
January 10-11, 2015 At least 20 are killed and 18 injured in Maidugri after explosives strapped to a girl were detonated 
at a market place screening checkpoint. At least three are dead and 43 injured after two suicide 
bombs strapped to girls detonate in a mobile phone market in Potiskun. Boko Haram is suspected 
as being behind the attacks 
              Source: Cable news Network (CNN)and Irinnews.org 
 
1.5. Boko Haram 
1.5.1. Origins 
The origin of Boko Haram seems to lie in a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Alhaji 
Muhammah Ndimi Mosque in Maidugri in 2002 (Anyadike, 2013). An offshoot of this youth group declared the city 
Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies, 2015, 2(3): 82-88 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. The group moved from Maidugri to a 
village called Kanama, Yobe state near the border with Niger to set up a separatist community run on hard line 
Islamic principles (Adesoji, 2010). Its leader Mohammed Ali, espoused anti state ideology and called on other 
Muslims to join the group and return to a life under true Islamic law with the aim of making a more perfect society 
away from corrupt establishment (Anyadike, 2013). 
Boko Haram is a term taken from the Hausa language for „the Boko is a sin‟ which has the connotation that 
“Western education is forbidden”. This terminology is derived from the public perception of the ideology and 
operation of the group and clearly shows the groups anti-western nature (Adesoji, 2010). This public perception is 
closely connected to the group‟s outright opposition to Darwinism and the position of its founder Mohammed Yusuf, 
that the teaching and acquisition of the knowledge of this philosophy is sinful for Muslims. Yusuf saw Darwinism as 
an absolute contradiction to the Islamic philosophy of existence and therefore advanced the belief that any 
knowledge that contradicts the principles of Islam is not allowed by Allah. The group‟s ideology is not limited to its 
opposition to Western education, but it abhors western liberalism as a whole. Its founder maintained that “democracy 
and the current system of education must be changed otherwise this war that is yet to start will continue for long 
(Salkida, 2009).  
The group declared in a statement released to the press in 2009 that they are opposed not to formal education but 
to:  
western ways of life which include constitutional provision as it relates to for instance the rights and 
privileges of women, the idea of homosexualism, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug 
trafficking, rape of infants, multiparty democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue 
films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilizations. 
(Vanguard, 2009). 
 
1.5.2. Membership 
In the early stages, the Boko Haram sect was widely known to have mobilized its membership from women and 
children „school drop outs‟ and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates (Danjibo, 2009; Alozieuwa, 2012; 
Hussein, 2012). These recruits were indoctrinated to believe that their state of hopelessness was caused by 
government which imposed western education on them had failed to manage the resources of the country to their 
benefits. Serious concerns over the violent tendencies grew after the open confrontation between the sect and the 
government in July 2009 (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012). Aside the local members of Boko Haram mentioned 
above, a number of its members were recruited from Nigeria‟s neighboring states especially Mali, Cameroon and 
Republics of Chad and Niger (Omonobi, 2011). 
 
1.5.3. International Links 
Boko Haram by compelling indicators is believed to have substantial connections with individuals and 
organizations outside Nigeria. (Onapajo et al., 2012). The groups association with international organizations started 
with Mauritania after the fall of the states country‟s democratic government in 2005. Boko Haram was contacted by 
Mauritanian warlords who were to recruit mercenaries from among Boko Haram members to fight in the conflict that 
ensued after the military coup in the state. Some members of Boko Haram accepted the offer and received military 
training in the country (Sahara Reporters, 2011). 
The group realized the need to establish networks with transnational groups. Following this, they employed the 
tactic of publicly identifying itself with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden (Vanguard, 2009). In other instances, 
leaders of Boko Haram have claimed connections with Al Qaeda in the Mahgrib (AQIM) and Al Shabab in Somalia. 
This was authenticated by a claim first raised by a top US military commander, General Carter Ham, who hinted that 
Boko Haram was in the process of establishing cooperation with AQIM and wanted to have a loose partnership with 
Al Shabab (Adeyemi and Chukwu, 2011). The UN Security Council has reported that it received information that 
Boko Haram members had also trained in AQIM camps in Mali (Brock, 2012) and there are reports that further link 
Boko Haram to the insurgency in Northern Mali. 
 
 
Figur-2.A Map of North-Eastern Nigeria Where Boko Haram Attacks Has Been Intense 
               Source: Irinnews.org 
 
The activities of Boko Haram has spanned from December 2003 to date. However for analysis purposes and for 
the fact that their activities are in continuum, this study will limit itself to the period from December 2003 to January 
2015. Undoubtedly the activities of Boko Haram are causing a lot of distress to the people and government of 
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Nigeria. But the consequence of these attacks on other West African countries is quite telling. The attacks of Boko 
Haram have spilled over the borders of Nigeria to other West African states like Chad, Niger and Cameroon 
(www.unhcr.org/546228896.html, 2014). On February 13 2015 Boko Haram attacked civilians in Ngouboua, Chad 
where many persons including the local traditional leader and several others were injured 
(www.unhcr.org/546228896.html, 2014). On February 6-8 2015 similar attacks were carried out by Boko Haram in 
Kerewa, Cameroon and Diffa in Niger (www.unhcr.org/546228896.html, 2014) more important of the effect of Boko 
Haram activities on other West African is the displacement of persons and refugee situations.  
According to the UNHCR about 90,000 people including Niger nationals had found refuge in Niger‟s Diffa 
region since May 2013. It also reports that 200, 000 people have fled Nigeria to neighboring countries including 
Chad Cameroon and Niger, according to figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), due to ongoing violence in Nigeria‟s Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States caused by armed insurgents 
reportedly associated with extremist group Boko Haram. The UNHCR on 9
th
 January 2015 further reported that 
attacks in Borno have uprooted about 300 Nigerians forcing them into Western Chad where most are staying with 
local communities in Villages around 450 kilometers north west of the capital, Ndjamena. Clearly the Boko Haram 
attacks have gotten to proportions of international threat to security and humanity. 
 
1.6. Discussion 
In order to assess the response of ECOWAS towards these two issues, one will have to conduct a comparative 
analysis of the steps ECOWAS took to address these issues. Outbreaks of Ebola in West Africa began in December 
2013. By September 2014 a total of 4507 had been confirmed dead. ECOWAS as a regional body responded to the 
Ebola disease officially by July 2 2014 barely a year after the breakout of the EVD. The attention of Ebola continued 
persistently from July to November 2014 when the morbidity rate of Ebola had dropped drastically for instance, both 
Nigeria and Senegal were declared Ebola free countries in October 2014.Clearly there is no specific treaty or 
protocol that deals with the outbreak of diseases. However the outbreak was considered a regional security threat as 
stated by the council of Chiefs of Defence Staff of the ECOWAS. By this description, one would have expected that 
the ECOWAS protocol on Mechanism for conflict, prevention management, resolution, peace-keeping and security 
should have been enforced. The provisions of the said protocol do not make any explicit provisions for the fight 
against an epidemic disease. However, its security implications necessitated a response from the regional body and 
be it as it may, the response of ECOWAS towards Ebola even though reactionary could be said to be appreciable.  
In the case of Boko Haram insurgency, the attacks started as far back as December 2003.  From a face count of 
the timeline activities by CNN a total number 3400 people killed by January 11, 2015. Their actions fall directly in 
the provisions of the protocol on Mechanism for conflict, prevention management, resolution, peace keeping and 
security, anticipation of the types of aggression. For emphasis purposes this study will restate the anticipation of the 
protocol.  
The three types of aggression anticipated by the protocol are: 
1. An internal armed conflict in a member state organized and actively supported from without and 
likely to endanger the peace and security of the entire community 
2. An armed conflict between two or more member states or 
3. Or an external armed threat or aggression. 
Clearly, Boko Haram is an internal armed conflict in a member state organized and actively supported from 
without and likely to endanger the peace and security of the entire community. As mentioned earlier, the activities of 
Boko Haram has spilled over the borders of Nigeria into neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger. On 
June 4, 2013 President Goodluck Jonathan approved the proscription of Boko Haram and splinter group Ansaru as a 
terrorist organization. Again on November 13, 2013 U.S State Department added Boko Haram and Ansaru to its list 
of terrorist organizations (CNN, 2014). Unfortunately ECOWAS has failed to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist 
organization, which makes it extremely difficult to understand why ECOWAS up until now has not been able to do 
same nor put in force the implementation of the Protocol stated above, which will have enabled member states to join 
force in fighting the Boko Haram insurgency  
The protocol outlines how to deal with these types of aggressions, should it occur as follows: 
1. An ECOWAS authority to act as the supreme organ to determine when to invoke the protocol and determine 
the necessity for military action. 
2. A defence council composed of foreign and defence ministers of member states to assist the authority in this 
function. 
3. A defence commission of chiefs of defence of member states responsible for examining the technical aspects 
of any defence issue and implementing any duties assigned to the defence council. 
4. A deputy executive secretary (military who would be a senior serving military officer to take charge of the 
administration and implementation of defence; and  
(b) Allied Armed Forces of the community consisting of designated units of armed forces of 
member states, under a force commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority on the advice of 
the Defence Council. 
It also becomes unconscionable to think that activities of Boko Haram started as far back as 2003 and yet as at 
2015 not even an emergency meeting of the Authority of heads of states had been convened to deliberate on Boko 
Haram insurgency as a regional security threat. Clearly the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by 
ECOWAS and the invocation of the above stated protocol will have enabled the allied forces to mobilize to curtail 
the activities of Boko Haram in the ECOWAS region. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
This paper has broadly examined the response of ECOWAS to the Ebola outbreak and Boko Haram issues. The 
paper finds that even though both issues qualify as a security threat to the West African Sub region, the response by 
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ECOWAS has not been encouraging. In the case of Ebola, even though the regional body did not respond in time, it 
has been able to help in curtailing the Ebola issue. Unfortunately, ECOWAS has failed considerably in addressing 
the Boko Haram issue, in spite of the fact that the activities of the insurgent group serves as a great security threat to 
the region. ECOWAS has failed to invoke the ECOWAS protocol on conflict prevention management that empowers 
them to act in case of any action that threatens the peace of the people in the region. 
Based on this analysis, this paper safely concludes that ECOWAS has been nothing but lackadaisical and lazy 
about the issue of Boko Haram. ECOWAS continues to underrate the terrorist group Boko Haram and the security 
challenges it poses to the region. Even though ECOWAS has performed creditably well in dealing with Ebola, it has 
failed woefully in combating terrorist activities in the case of Boko Haram. It is hoped that the Head of States of 
member countries will take the necessary steps to bring an end to the activities of Boko Haram in the region. 
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